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Non-technical Summary
The innovative activity of companies is a driving force for economic growth. New devel-
opments benefit consumers by offering a greater choice of products and services; additional
markets and earning opportunities for enterprises are created. Although large companies
spend a high share of the total R&D expenditure of the private sector, small and medium-
sized companies (SMEs) are also important players in the innovation process. In 2004,
companies with less then 500 employees contributed to 12.5% to the R&D expenditures of
the German private sector.
In this paper we analyze whether the equity capital available to SMEs affects their R&D
activity using a representative survey of German companies. Equity is important for the
R&D activity, since bank loans are difficult to obtain for R&D projects. Banks prefer to lend
to safer projects that are easier to evaluate and provide more collateral. Young companies
have specific problems with bank loans due to their higher default risk and since they still
need to establish a relationship with the bank. We test the hypothesis that companies
with a higher equity ratio will engage more in R&D activities, measured alternatively as
the probability of pursuing R&D and as the R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditures to
sales). The hypothesis is tested separately for young and old companies.
Using banking competition at the district level as instrument to control for reverse causal-
ity, we find that a higher equity ratio is conducive to more R&D for young but not for old
companies. Whereas old companies have had time to build up equity via retained profits,
young companies have to rely on the original investment of the owners. In addition, should
extra financing be required while the R&D project is executed, older companies can rely
more on bank loans whereas young companies need to provide a financial cushion for bad
times themselves.
The positive influence of equity financing is only found for R&D intensity but not for the
decision whether to perform R&D. This suggests that equity is only important for higher
levels of R&D intensity, for example for young high-tech firms. These companies therefore
depend on a functioning market for external equity, if the personal funds of the original
owners are not sufficient to cover the financing needs. If R&D is only a minor part in the
overall activities, young companies do not have a special requirement in terms of equity to
finance their R&D. It can be that for these firms the level of overall risk is low enough for
banks to be more willing to extend loans.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the importance of equity finance for the R&D activity of small
and medium-sized enterprises. We use information on almost 6000 German SMEs from
a company survey. Using the intensity of banking competition at the district level as
instrument to control for endogeneity, we find that a higher equity ratio is conducive
to more R&D for young but not for old companies. Equity may be a constraining
factor for young companies which have to rely on the original equity investment of
their owners since they have not yet accumulated retained earnings and can relay less
on outside financing. The positive influence is found for R&D intensity but not for the
decision whether to perform R&D. Equity financing is therefore especially important
for the most innovative, young companies.
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1 Introduction
The innovative activity of companies is a driving force for economic growth. Consumers
benefit from a greater choice of products and services, whereas companies benefit from
the creation of additional markets and earning opportunities. At the macroeconomic level,
innovations speed up structural adjustment to engender new viable sectors and play a vital
part for the creation of new jobs (Peters (2004)). Although large companies spend a high
share of the total R&D expenditure of the private sector, small and medium-sized companies
(SMEs) are also important players in the innovation process. In 2004, companies with less
than 500 employees contributed to 12.5% to the R&D expenditures of the German private
sector (Stifterverband (2005)). On the one hand, small companies face disadvantages because
they cannot exploit scale economies and are restricted in the types of financing they can raise
for their R&D activities. On the other hand, some characteristics of SMEs even facilitate
the implementation of R&D projects (Acs and Audretsch (1990)). Managers may know
more about the technology, there may be an entrepreneurial spirit more favourable to risk
taking, and researchers may encounter fewer bureaucratic hurdles (Scherer (1991); Link and
Bozeman (1991)).
The literature on R&D activity has originally mainly concentrated on the influence of com-
pany size, technological opportunity and appropriability (Cohen and Levin (1989)). More
recently, the influence of the financial structure of the company has also been of interest.
Whereas some authors considered the influence of cash-flows (see, for example, Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994)), we focus on the influence of equity financing.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of whether the equity capital available
to companies affects their R&D activity using a representative survey of German companies
from KfW Bankengruppe (formerly Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau). We test the hypothesis
that companies with a higher equity ratio will engage more in R&D activities, measured
alternatively as the probability of pursuing R&D and as the R&D intensity (ratio of R&D
expenditures to sales).
We focus on unlisted, small and medium-sized companies. In contrast to listed companies,
they depend for their equity financing strong on the personal funds of a limited number of
owners. Furthermore, we differentiate between young and old companies. The R&D activity
of young companies is more likely to be constrained by the availability of equity capital,
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since young companies have not yet had the opportunity to increase their equity base by
accumulated earnings.
Young, innovative companies have only a limited choice between different types of financ-
ing. Bank loans are not a suitable form of finance for R&D projects due to the high risk
inherent in such endeavours (Himmelberg and Petersen (1994)). Venture capital financing
is a more appropriate form. However, the VC market in Germany is not well developed
(Zimmermann and Karle (2005)). In the year 2004 only 844 companies received venture
capital financing (BVK (2005)), whereas there are approximately 36,000 SMEs performing
continuous R&D in Germany (Rammer et al. (2006)). 1 Furthermore the early stage segment
in the German VC market is declining since the boom period at the end of the nineties. The
share of the early stage segment in total fundraising decreased from 35 percent in 2000 to
3.5 percent in 2003. This shows that even investors in the VC market hesitate to take the
high risks of young innovative firms.
In our analysis, causality can go in both directions. On the one hand, the availability of
equity can influence the R&D activity, since owners will only start R&D projects if their
capital base is sufficient to sustain projects until returns materialize. R&D projects have
often no early cash flow to pay interest on loans. Owners may be unwilling to engage in
R&D if it endangers the survival of the company. On the other hand, companies with R&D
activity may find debt financing especially expensive or may not have access to this type of
financing at all. In addition, if innovative companies benefit from successful R&D projects
via higher profits, they can increase their equity base through retained earnings. In order to
identify the first direction of causality, we use alternatively two instruments for the equity
ratio. The first instrument is competition in the banking sector at the district level; the
second is a rating of the financial standing of the company, a part of the company’s credit
rating.
We find a significant influence of the equity ratio for the R&D activity of young but
not of old companies. Young companies may therefore be constrained in their innovative
endeavours by their limited access to equity financing. When differentiating between the
1 The number of R&D performing SMEs in Rammer et al. (2006) includes only companies with at least
five employees and excludes the retail sector. The statistics of the German Private Equity and Venture
Capital Association (BVK) are the most comprehensive information available. According to the BVK they
cover 90% of the volume of the German VC market (Krahnen and Schmidt (2004)).
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probability of R&D and the R&D intensity, only the R&D intensity is influenced by the
equity ratio. For low levels of R&D, the financial structure is therefore not of importance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains theoretical considerations of financ-
ing problems. Section 3 summarizes the existing literature. Section 4 describes the data set.
Section 5 describes the financing of German SMEs. Section 6 presents the empirical results.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background to Financing Problems
2.1 Problems of Debt Financing of R&D Projects
R&D projects have special characteristics that make debt financing difficult.2 First, returns
of R&D projects are highly uncertain. Often there is a high probability of failure combined
with the possibility of high returns if successful. Due to fixed interest payments banks do
not participate in the high returns of successful outcomes, they are therefore more concerned
with the probability of failure when calculating the price for the loan which can lead to high
interest rates or to the decision not to lend at all (Stiglitz (1985)).
Second, the quality of R&D projects is difficult to evaluate. Not only is technical knowl-
edge necessary, owners also want to keep details of their R&D activity secret. The result
is severe problems of asymmetric information in the form of adverse selection and moral
hazard, which can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Hence, the bank may
decide not to extend loans for R&D projects.
Third, R&D projects often do not involve assets that can be used as collateral. Wages of
scientists and engineers account for a high share of R&D expenditures and if tangible assets
are bought, they have often a low resale value because they are company specific. R&D
activity therefore provides little inside collateral that could be offered to banks to make
lending less risky. Bester (1985) shows that collateral can be used as a screening device
to avoid rationing in credit markets.3 Furthermore, Williamson (1988) concludes from a
2Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) gives a detailed discussion of financing R&D activities with bank loans.
3Collateral is an important instrument used by banks. In their sample of bank loans extended by five
large German banks, Elsas and Krahnen (2002) find that 71% of the loans are collateralized and 31.5% of
the total credit volume is covered by collateral. Lehmann et al. (2004) report average collateral coverage of
61% for Western Germany and 53% for Eastern Germany.
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transaction cost economics point of view that non-redeployable assets, such as investments
in R&D, should be financed with equity.
2.2 Problems of Debt Financing of Young Companies
In addition to the problems of debt financing of R&D projects, young companies have age-
specific problems with access to bank loans. Banks use relationship lending to alleviate
problems of asymmetric information when lending to small companies (see, for example,
Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995)). Banks collect information about
the companies over time, which allows them to make well based loan decisions. Since young
companies start without such a track record, banks may be reluctant to offer loans. It often
needs time for the management to establish a functioning relationship with the decision
makers of their local bank branch.
A further impediment for bank loans is the higher default risk of young companies. Fritsch
et al. (2004) document the probabilities for going out of business for German companies,
finding a decrease in the probability of exit with firm age. After ten years only 46 percent
of the start-ups in manufacturing are still in business and about 37 percent of the start-ups
in services. There are several possible reasons for the higher exit rates of young compa-
nies, among them inexperienced management, problems of developing a customer base and
problems of establishing the product in the market.
Scha¨fer et al. (2004) investigate the choice between debt and equity for young innovative
SMEs in Germany. They find that banks confine the risk by concentrating on firms with a
high equity ratio, high prize cost margin and smaller deal sizes if they engage in this higher
risk lending activity.
3 Related Literature
The analysis of this paper focuses on the influence of the financial structure on the R&D
activity of companies. This direction of causality has so far found scant attention in the
literature and focuses primarily on listed companies. Singh and Faircloth (2005) document
for their sample of large, listed US companies a negative influence of leverage on R&D
intensity. The authors restrict their sample to companies with minimum positive R&D
expenditure and do not use instruments to establish the direction of causality. Since the
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sample excludes companies without and without continuous R&D activity, the analysis can
not cover the decision to undertake R&D. Bhagat and Welch (1995) compare the influence of
leverage on R&D intensity across countries for listed companies using a VAR approach. For
the US they find a positive effect, whereas it is negative for Japan. The authors conclude that
US lenders may be less willing to finance R&D projects. Also using a VAR approach, Chiao
(2002) finds a negative influence of debt on R&D intensity for listed US companies in science-
based industries and a positive influence for companies in nonscience-based industries.
So far, the literature is mainly concerned with the direction of causality from R&D activity
to the capital structure (see Hall (2002) for a literature survey). Aghion et al. (2004) find
higher leverage for listed UK companies with R&D activity together with an decrease in
leverage in the R&D intensity. Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) study the determinants of
leverage for a sample of small, unlisted Finnish companies. The authors document especially
low leverage for companies in the ICT sector with high R&D intensity. Neither of the analyses
uses instruments to determine the direction of causality.
A less closely related branch of the literature studies the influence of financial constraints
on the investment behaviour of companies. Companies are said to be financially constrained
if they face higher costs of external as compared to internal finance. Fazzari et al. (1988)
look at investment in general. Harhoff (1998), Bond et al. (1999), Himmelberg and Petersen
(1994) and Czarnitzki (2005) consider R&D expenditures as a specific form of investment in
future growth options.
4 Data
The analysis is based on a panel survey of German small and medium-sized companies
conducted by KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt/Main, Germany (KfW-Mittelstandspanel). In
addition to basic company characteristics, this data set includes information on the innova-
tive activities of companies and their financial structure. Small and medium-sized companies
are defined as companies with less than Euro 500 million turnover. There is no minimum
number of employees required for the inclusion into the panel. This is a big advantage
compared to other data sets, since many surveys impose a size requirement of at least five
employees. We find that even the smallest companies report substantive innovative activity;
for example, 10% of companies without employees have positive R&D expenditures. It can
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Stdev. Min Max
Number of employees 47.7 18.5 82.0 0 948
Company age (in years) 31.7 13 37.5 1 410
Equity ratio 0.21 0.15 0.21 0 1
R&D intensity 1.96 0 5.58 0 70
Dummy for R&D activity 0.26 0 0.44 0 1
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, wave of 2003. All values refer to the year 2002.
also be expected that very small companies have more severe financing problems. In order to
better understand the relationship between financial structure and R&D activity for SMEs,
it is important to observe the very small companies in the data. The survey covers both the
manufacturing and the service sector.
The sample of the survey was determined with a stratified random sample procedure.
The stratification was done according to six size groups (up to 4 employees, 5-9, 10-19,
20-49, 50-99 and 100 or more employees), five industries (manufacturing, construction, re-
tail, wholesale and services), region (Western versus Eastern Germany) and participation
in a government support programme for SMEs conducted by KfW Bankengruppe.4 We use
unweighted regression procedures with controls for the stratification variables.
Information on 5,795 companies from the first wave collected in 2003 is used for the
main part of the analysis. 31% of the companies are in the manufacturing sector, 18% in
construction, 28% in retail/wholesale and 23% in services. Companies in the banking and
insurance industry are excluded from our analysis. The section on access to bank finance
draws on a combination with the second wave of 2004. Unfortunately, a panel analysis is
not possible, since the second wave did not ask about R&D activities.
Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Table 1. The average number of
employees measured in full-time equivalents is below 50, since only small and medium-sized
companies are covered. The age of the companies has a wide dispersion with an average of
32 years. The equity ratio, defined as book value of equity capital divided by total assets,
4The programmes mainly support the investment activities of existing and newly founded companies.
They are based on either support for bank loans or equity capital.
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Table 2: Company Characteristics According to R&D Activity
Mean Median
Sig. lev.
Variable R&D no R&D difference R&D no R&D
Number of employees 71.0 39.7 < 1% *** 35.5 15
Total assets (in ’000 EUR) 8,045 5,985 < 1% *** 3,100 1,450
Total equity (in ’000 EUR) 2,085 1,221 < 1% *** 423 168
Company age (in years) 32.2 31.5 73% 13 13
Equity ratio 0.23 0.20 < 1% *** 0.18 0.13
Equity per owner (in ’000 EUR) 1,026 536 < 1% *** 235 100
No of owners 1.96 1.69 < 1% *** 2 1
Source: KfW-Mittelstandspanel, wave of 2003. All values refer to the year 2002.
has an average value of 21%.5 The R&D intensity, defined as R&D expenditures divided by
sales, has a mean of 2.0% and 26% of the companies report R&D activity, i.e. positive R&D
expenditures.
5 The Financing Situation of German SMEs
5.1 Comparing Companies with and without R&D Activity
In order to get a better understanding of the financing conditions of small and medium-sized
companies, we investigate whether there are structural differences between companies with
and without R&D activity. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for both company types.
A striking difference is the significantly larger size of R&D performing companies, which is
reflected in almost twice the number of employees. The larger size is also indicated by a
higher value of total assets and of total equity.6 There are no significant differences with
5A small number of companies with negative equity were excluded from the sample. Liabilities can exceed
the assets of a company, if repeated losses eat up the equity capital. The company is not closed, if creditors
believe that loans can be repaid with future profits. Companies with zero equity were retained.
6The size difference cannot be explained with companies being larger in industries that typically perform
more R&D as the difference still exists after controlling for industry effects.
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respect to company age – the difference in the mean is negligible.
The financing choices of both company types vary markedly, illustrating a higher need
for equity capital for innovative companies. The equity ratio is three percentage points
higher for companies with positive R&D activity. A difference that is statistically significant
at the 1% level. In addition, owners of companies with R&D activity on average invest a
substantially higher amount. Equity per owner has a mean of Euro 1,026,000 for companies
with and of Euro 536,000 for companies without R&D activity. In order to raise enough
equity, companies can tap the personal funds of several owners. This possibility is reflected
in a higher number of owners in innovative companies. Both the differences in equity per
owner and in the number of owners are significant at the 1% level.
The differences in the equity ratio between companies with and without R&D can also
be seen in Figure 1. The equity ratio of R&D performing firms is higher in all age groups
than the equity ratio of non R&D performing firms. Over time the equity ratio increases
for both groups, because companies use profits to pay back bank loans and to increase the
equity capital through retained earnings.
Figure 1: The Relationship Between Equity Ratio and Age
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5.2 Access to Bank Financing
This subsection conveys an impression about which types of companies face particular diffi-
culties in obtaining external finance. We use information on the outcome of loan applications
that was asked in the second wave of the survey from companies with positive investment
activity in the year prior to the survey and combine it with the R&D information of the
first wave. The number of observations is substantially lower than in the following main
section, because not all companies invested in 2003 and not all companies participated in
both waves.
Column (1) of table 3 shows results of a probit regression with the dependent variable
equal to one if the company applied for a loan in the year prior to the survey. R&D activity,
size and age have no influence on this decision. The only significant explanatory variable is
the equity ratio, with an increase in the equity ratio by one standard deviation (0.20) leading
to a decrease in the probability of a loan application by 2.4 percentage points. There is no
indication that companies with a higher R&D intensity have a lower demand for bank loans.
However, it is possible that some companies expect a loan denial and are discouraged from
applying.
The probit regression in column (2) only considers companies with loan applications and
identifies the characteristics that lead to a higher probability of failed negotiations. Negoti-
ations can either fail because the bank makes no loan offer or because the offer is rejected
by the company. Of the companies which applied, 46% were unsuccessful. An important
determinant for a failed negotiation is the R&D intensity. A one standard deviation increase
(0.05) leads to an increase in the probability of failure by 2.8 percentage points. This can be
seen as evidence that companies with higher R&D intensity find it more difficult to obtain a
bank loan. Interestingly, if a dummy for R&D activity is used instead, no influence on loan
availability is found. Only if the R&D activity is substantial enough to have an influence on
company characteristics will there be difficulties with bank finance.7 The other significant
regressor is the equity ratio with a positive influence on successful negotiations, which is
plausible since companies with a high equity ratio are less likely to default.
Finally, in column (3) we investigate in more detail why negotiations failed, restricting the
7There is also an alternative explanation: companies with higher R&D intensity may have more market
power which could allow them to let negotiations fail more often.
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Table 3: Access to Bank Financing – Marginal Effects of Probit Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. variable Loan application Negotiations failed No loan offer
R&D intensity 0.095 0.531* 0.199
(0.205) (0.285) (0.392)
Equity ratio -0.122** -0.302*** -0.170
(0.051) (0.078) (0.112)
No of employees 0.362 -0.030 -2.171***
(0.246) (0.326) (0.682)
Square no of employees -0.001 0.001 0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.004**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Square age 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of observations 2,107 1,406 650
Log likelihood -1,239 -928 -399
Mean of dependent variable 0.71 0.46 0.45
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions contain industry dummies comparable to the 3-digit SIC
level, a dummy for limited liability, for participating in a government support programme and for Eastern
German companies. The R&D intensity is expressed as ratio.
sample to companies with unsuccessful negotiations. The dependent variable is coded with
one if the bank made no loan offer and with zero if the company received an offer but declined
it. Both reasons have a similar probability of about 50%. When evaluated at their means,
both size and age have a negative effect on the dependent variable, i.e. smaller and younger
companies have a higher probability of not receiving an offer by the bank. By implication,
they have a lower probability of declining themselves an offer. One can claim that no matter
whether no offer was received or the offer was so unfavourable that the company declined
it, the economic outcome is the same: the company was unsuccessful in its effort to obtain
a loan. However, we would argue that not receiving an offer at all is a sign of a weaker
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bargaining position of the company vis-a-vis the bank. With this interpretation, small and
young companies are less well placed to negotiate bank loans.
6 The Importance of Equity Finance for R&D Activity
6.1 Empirical Model
For the empirical analysis we first employ a Tobit model with the R&D intensity as dependent
variable. It takes account of the fact that many companies report zero values of R&D
expenditure. In the Tobit model regressors have the same influence on the probability of
doing a positive amount of R&D as on the R&D intensity itself, a restriction that is lifted
in the second model. The hurdle model (see Cragg (1971)) consists of two parts: the first is
a probit model with a dummy variable for positive amounts of R&D as dependent variable;
the second is a Tobit model restricted to companies with positive R&D. The separation into
two parts allows for more flexibility. If there are differences either in the size of the influence
of explanatory variables or in their significance, the hurdle model makes them transparent.8
6.2 Controlling for Reverse Causality
Our estimates can be influenced by reverse causality. Not only can equity capital be a
prerequisite for R&D activity, it is also possible that companies with R&D activity select a
capital structure with a higher proportion of equity, since bank loans can be more expensive
for riskier companies. Also, companies with R&D activity can have difficulties with obtaining
a bank loan at all.
In order to identify the effect of the equity ratio on the R&D activity, we use instruments.
The first instrument is the local banking competition. Theoretically, more intense competi-
tion in the banking sector can have two effects. It can improve the availability of bank loans
if banks spend more resources to identify good companies in order to keep their market share.
It can also decrease the availability of loans, since companies can more easily switch from
8The Heckman selection model is not appropriate here. For companies without R&D activity the R&D
intensity is known to be zero and therefore not missing. Furthermore, the R&D intensity can only have non-
negative values, whereas the main equation of the Heckman model disregards this restriction (Wooldridge
(2002)).
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one bank to the other. Banks therefore find it harder to obtain rents from ongoing customer
relationships with good companies and may therefore be less willing to extend loans to new
companies.9 The availability of loans influences the equity ratio of the companies. If loans
are more easily available, companies will operate with a lower equity ratio.
We define banking competition at the district level as the number of banks active in a
district divided by the population of the district. Data on the number of banks and their
branches at the district level are obtained from the Bundesbank, the former German central
bank. Since districts are of varying size and more banks will be active in larger districts,
we use the population to normalize the variable.10 The number of banks active in a district
corresponds to the number of banks that have at least one branch in this district. For
example, Deutsche Bank is not only active in Frankfurt/Main, but in each district where it
operates a branch.
Whereas it is difficult to imagine that banking competition should have a direct influence
on the R&D activity of companies, there is possibly an indirect influence. Banking com-
petition may be higher in districts with a higher income per capita, because the market is
more lucrative. A higher income can be an indicator for a well educated population, which
can be related to a higher average R&D intensity of the companies in the district, since
R&D intensive companies find it more attractive to settle in districts where they can find a
well educated work force. In the second-stage instrumental variable regressions we therefore
control for the income per capita at the district level and include dummies for a classification
of districts into nine categories according to urban or rural type.11
We calculate a second set of estimates with the instrument financial standing of the
companies to test the robustness of our results. The information is obtained from Germany’s
largest credit rating agency, Creditreform, and then merged to the KfW-Mittelstandspanel.
The financial standing is an element of the overall credit rating. It is coded from one for
9Petersen and Rajan (1995) develop this argument and provide empirical evidence for this effect for US
banks. However, for the German capital market with a strong relationship between the company and a
single bank (“Hausbankprinzip”) it can be assumed that this argument is less relevant.
10Germany is divided into 439 districts (Kreis or kreisfreie Stadt). Berlin is the largest district with a
population of 3.4 million and Zweibru¨cken is the smallest district with a population of 36,000.
11Income per capita and population figures are taken from Statistik regional 2004, German National Statis-
tical Offices (Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder). The categorization of districts follows INKAR
2004, Federal Office for Construction and Regional Planning (Bundesamt fu¨r Bauwesen und Raumordnung).
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Table 4: First Stage Regression Results
(1) (2)
Dep. variable Equity ratio
Local banking competition -0.014** (0.007)
Financial standing -0.0027*** (0.001)
No of employees -0.027 (0.063) -0.073 (0.073)
Square no of employees 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Age 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Square age -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
No of observations 5,795 4,288
R squared 0.043 0.050
Note: All regressions contain a dummy for whether the company participated in a government support
programme, a regional dummy and industry dummies comparable to the 3-digit SIC level. The regression
in columns (1) also contains controls for income per capita at the district level and dummies for district
type. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and
1 percent levels, respectively.
the best standing to six for the worst. Suppliers of trade credit can enquire at Creditreform
about the financial standing of their customers to help them with their credit decision. Since
banks prefer to lend to good risks, the rating also gives an indication of how easy a company
will find it to obtain bank loans. This instrument should therefore be correlated with the
endogenous variable equity ratio. On the other hand, no information about R&D activity is
used to determine the financial standing. The instrument should therefore not be correlated
with the dependent variable.
The results of the first-stage regressions are reported in Table 4. Column (1) reports
the results for the use of banking competition. A higher degree of competition leads to
a significantly lower equity ratio, i.e. the supply of bank loans improves with competition.
Column (2) shows that companies with a better financial standing have a higher equity ratio.
The instrument is significant to the 1% level.
6.3 Estimates without Instruments
In Table 5 column (1) we present the results of the Tobit model and in columns (2) to (3)
the results of the hurdle model. We find a positive relationship between equity ratio and
13
R&D activity for the Tobit model and for the first part of the hurdle model covering the
probability of R&D. For the R&D intensity restricted to R&D performing companies we find
a positive but insignificant effect. These results can be influenced by reverse causality since
the equity ratio is not instrumented.
Evaluated at the mean of the number of employees we find a positive influence of size on
R&D for the models of columns (1) and (2) and a negative influence for column (3). Large
companies have therefore a higher probability of pursuing R&D but with a lower intensity.
The age variable has a negative effect at its mean in all three models. The control for limited
liability shows a positive influence on the probability of R&D, but no influence on the R&D
intensity of R&D performing companies. We also control for participation in a government
support programme, a regional indicator and industry classification, because these variables
were used to stratify the random sample.
Columns (4) to (6) contain the same econometric models with an interaction term allowing
for a different influence of the equity ratio at young and old companies.12 A company is
defined as young if it is ten years or younger. For old companies we do not find an influence
of the equity ratio any more. However, the equity ratio has a significant effect for the R&D
intensity of young companies, both when all companies and when only the R&D active
companies are considered. Since we use no instruments here, it is not clear whether this
effect should be interpreted as indicating equity as necessary financing type for R&D or
as R&D intensity influencing the financial structure of the young companies. There is no
influence of the equity ratio on the probability of performing R&D.
6.4 Estimates with Instruments
In order to identify the direction of causality, we instrument the variable equity ratio. Table 6
presents results with local banking competition used as instrument. The specifications in
columns (1) to (3) without interaction terms show now no significant influence of the equity
ratio. This can be either a sign that the instrument is too weak or that the previous
regressions where influenced by reverse causality.
For the specifications with interaction term we confirm the pattern found without instru-
ments. The equity ratio has a significant influence on the R&D intensity of young companies
12The sample contains 1,873 companies up to the age of 10 years (32% of the total).
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but not on the decision to undertake R&D. This suggests that equity financing is only
important for higher levels of R&D intensity, such as e.g. young high-tech firms have. If
R&D is only a minor part in the overall activities of the company, young companies do not
have a special requirement in terms of equity to finance their R&D activities. It can be
that in these firms the level of overall risk is low enough for banks to be willing to extend
loans. Another explanation could be that these companies can pledge enough collateral from
other activities to satisfy the requirements of the bank for financing their low intensity R&D
activities. Besides the statistical significance, the effect is also economically important. In
the Tobit model of column (3) a one standard deviation increase in the equity ratio increases
the R&D intensity by 0.25 percentage points or by more than 10 percent. When only R&D
performing companies are considered, the R&D intensity increases by 0.8 percentage points,
an increase of also about 10 percent. In the instrumented regressions some of the additional
control variables lose their significance, but the ones who remain significant always keep their
sign.
Table 7 shows results with the instrument financial standing. The results are very similar
to the ones obtained with the instrument local banking competition. The equity ratio has
again a significant influence on the R&D intensity for young companies. The size of the
effects is about the same for both instruments, which shows the robustness of the results.
Compared to the regressions without instruments, the size of the effects are a bit larger.
One explanation can be measurement error in the variables that biases the uninstrumented
coefficients towards zero, another explanation can be a negative influence of reverse causality.
However, it is theoretically not expected that R&D intensity has a negative influence on the
equity ratio.
The analysis suggests that specifically young companies have problems with the financing
of R&D activities. The equity ratio exerts an important influence on the R&D intensity of
young but not of old companies. Whereas old companies have had time to build up equity
via retained profits, young companies have to rely on the original investment of the owners.
In addition, should additional financing be required while the R&D project is executed, older
companies can rely more on bank loans, as we saw in a previous section that older companies
have a lower probability of not obtaining a loan offer. Young companies need to provide a
financial cushion for bad times themselves.
Unfortunately, our analysis does not provide direct evidence that young companies are
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restricted by the availability of equity capital. If the original owners cannot increase their
investment because of exhausted personal funds, it is, in principle, possible to admit addi-
tional owners to increase the equity capital available to the company. However, it is often
not easy to find a person who is willing to invest his or her funds in a risky firm and who
fits into the existing team of owners. In addition, many owners do not want to share control
over the company. This last point is also often an argument against an investment of venture
capitalists, since they demand influence as well. Even if owners are willing to share control,
it is not easy to find a venture capitalist who is willing to engage in a young innovative
company in Germany, because the VC market is not well developed. Hence, the owners
of young companies may be only willing to engage in substantial R&D, if enough equity is
available or if the returns of the R&D project are high enough to make the acquisition of
additional equity feasible and worthwhile.
In some situations the required returns for obtaining new equity from additional owners
or venture capitalists may be too high. Companies may then refrain from undertaking
R&D. Since R&D projects have positive externalities (Arrow (1962)), there may be a reason
for the government to support R&D activities of young companies, possibly through the
improvement of the access to or the provision of cheaper equity capital.
6.5 Robustness Checks
Our main result of a significant influence of the equity ratio on the R&D intensity of young
companies is robust to a number of variations in the regression specification.
We obtain identical results if we use alternative measures of local banking competition
as an instrument. We tried the Herfindahl index and the sum of the three largest market
shares, each at the district level. The market share of a bank is measured as the number
of subsidiaries a bank has in a district divided by the total number of subsidiaries in the
district.
We also experiment with different cut-off points for the classification of a young company.
There is a trade-off between including only very young companies and thereby reducing the
number of observations and extending the range to older companies and possibly blurring
the effects of young age. We obtain significant coefficients for the interaction term if we
restrict the category of young companies to a maximum age of eight years, but the effect of
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equity ratio loses significance if we include companies up to the age of 12. With the cut-off
point of 10 years we found that the equity ratio is unimportant for old companies. This
effect may dominate, if the definition of young is chosen too broadly.
Finally, we excluded companies from the analysis that reported an equity value of zero.
The results also remain identical with this change.
7 Conclusions
Our analysis shows the importance of differentiating between young and old companies.
In the regressions without instruments we find a positive relationship between the equity
ratio and the R&D intensity for young but not for old companies. This relationship can
have two explanations: First, managers only choose to start R&D projects if they have the
necessary financial means in terms of equity capital to bring them to successful completion.
Second, companies prefer to finance with equity since it is the relatively cheaper means in
their situation or they are forced to finance with equity because they have no access to
bank loans. Using local banking competition and the financial standing of the company as
instrumental variables we find evidence for the first explanation.
The significance of the equity ratio only for young companies can mean that young compa-
nies are restricted in their R&D activities by equity capital. Equity capital is no restriction
for the R&D activities old companies, because they have had time to increase their equity
endowment through retained earnings and can rely more on bank loans.
Interestingly, we only find a relationship of the equity ratio with R&D intensity but not
with a dummy for R&D activity. This suggests that low levels of R&D activity do not
require substantially higher levels of equity financing whereas young companies with high
R&D efforts, such as young high-tech firms, need equity financing. Such companies therefore
depend on a functioning market for external equity.
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